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Abstract
Background: Detection of outbreaks of hospital-acquired infections is often based on simple rules, such as the occurrence
of three new cases of a single pathogen in two weeks on the same ward. These rules typically focus on only a few
pathogens, and they do not account for the pathogens’ underlying prevalence, the normal random variation in rates, and
clusters that may occur beyond a single ward, such as those associated with specialty services. Ideally, outbreak detection
programs should evaluate many pathogens, using a wide array of data sources.
Methods and Findings: We applied a space-time permutation scan statistic to microbiology data from patients admitted to
a 750-bed academic medical center in 2002–2006, using WHONET-SaTScan laboratory information software from the World
Health Organization (WHO) Collaborating Centre for Surveillance of Antimicrobial Resistance. We evaluated patients’ first
isolates for each potential pathogenic species. In order to evaluate hospital-associated infections, only pathogens first
isolated .2 d after admission were included. Clusters were sought daily across the entire hospital, as well as in hospital
wards, specialty services, and using similar antimicrobial susceptibility profiles. We assessed clusters that had a likelihood of
occurring by chance less than once per year. For methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) or vancomycin-resistant
enterococci (VRE), WHONET-SaTScan–generated clusters were compared to those previously identified by the Infection
Control program, which were based on a rule-based criterion of three occurrences in two weeks in the same ward. Two
hospital epidemiologists independently classified each cluster’s importance. From 2002 to 2006, WHONET-SaTScan found 59
clusters involving 2–27 patients (median 4). Clusters were identified by antimicrobial resistance profile (41%), wards (29%),
service (13%), and hospital-wide assessments (17%). WHONET-SaTScan rapidly detected the two previously known gram-
negative pathogen clusters. Compared to rule-based thresholds, WHONET-SaTScan considered only one of 73 previously
designated MRSA clusters and 0 of 87 VRE clusters as episodes statistically unlikely to have occurred by chance. WHONET-
SaTScan identified six MRSA and four VRE clusters that were previously unknown. Epidemiologists considered more than
95% of the 59 detected clusters to merit consideration, with 27% warranting active investigation or intervention.
Conclusions: Automated statistical software identified hospital clusters that had escaped routine detection. It also classified
many previously identified clusters as events likely to occur because of normal random fluctuations. This automated
method has the potential to provide valuable real-time guidance both by identifying otherwise unrecognized outbreaks
and by preventing the unnecessary implementation of resource-intensive infection control measures that interfere with
regular patient care.
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Although hospital-associated outbreaks of infection account for
a small proportion of health care–associated infections [1–4], the
fact that they typically result from transmission within health
care facilities means that timely identification is essential for
investigation and effective response. Current detection methods
rely heavily on temporal or spatial clustering of specific path-
ogens. Such monitoring usually involves case counting and
subjective judgment to adjudicate whether a cluster is occurring.
For multidrug-resistant organisms (MDROs), such as methicillin-
resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA), rule-based criteria (e.g.,
three cases within 2 wk in the same ward) are often used to define
a cluster. For example, Mellmann et al. used a definition of
two cases in 2 wk with identical spa types to define a MRSA
outbreak [5].
Ad hoc and rule-based criteria are subject to error—both in
defining random variation as a cluster and in failing to identify
clusters owing to hospital transmission that do not meet specified
rules. Reliance on the human eye to filter daily microbiology data
and detect clusters among hundreds of pathogens can lead to a
high failure rate. In addition, reliance on subjective judgment by
infection control professionals for cluster detection can lead to
interhospital variability and incorrect identification. Because
clusters (perceived or real) engender intensive investigation and
possible intervention, identification of false clusters can waste
valuable resources and dilute attention to real problems.
Microbiology-based cluster detection systems should use
automated statistical methods to optimize cluster identification,
lessen surveillance burden, and expand cluster detection to all
pathogens across all hospital locations and services. It should
automatically assess whether pathogens in a cluster had similar
antimicrobial susceptibility patterns that would suggest clonality
and a common source. Requirements for a useful system include
(1) automatic and timely generation of alerts of clusters, (2)
sufficient sensitivity to detect clinically significant clusters
identified through routine surveillance methods, and (3) suffi-
cient positive predictive value to avoid an excessive number of
false alerts that could generate unnecessary investigation and
intervention.
Methods
Ethics Statement
This study was approved by the Brigham & Women’s Hospital
(BWH) Institutional Review Board.
Study Population and Datasets
BWH is a 750-bed academic medical center. It provides
neonatal and adult medical care with intensive care and oncology
patient populations. Its electronic data repository contains
finalized microbiology data from 1987 to present. The microbi-
ology data repository includes patient identifiers, ward, and
clinical service at the time of specimen collection, collection date
and specimen source, and hospital admission date. Antimicrobial
susceptibility testing is based on Clinical and Laboratory
Standards Institute (CLSI) standards [6].
The entire microbiology data repository was used to identify the
first positive result per patient for a specific bacterial or fungal
species since 1987. The dataset was further restricted to isolates
representing hospital-associated acquisition (All Organism Noso-
comial Dataset) by limiting isolates to those obtained .2 d after
hospital admission. In addition, a second dataset was created that
limited pathogens to organism species associated with hospital
transmission on the basis of published literature (Priority Pathogen
Nosocomial Dataset) (Table 1). Because of national surveillance
related to multidrug-resistant bacteria, we additionally assessed
MRSA and VRE.
Automated Cluster Detection Tool
We integrated two freely available software packages used for
public health epidemiology. WHONET/BacLink software is
available from the World Health Organization (WHO) Collabo-
rating Centre for Surveillance of Antimicrobial Resistance for
management and descriptive analysis of microbiology data
[7]. BacLink is a data-conversion utility that standardizes data
from existing microbiology systems into WHONET formats.
WHONET/BacLink is used by .1,000 laboratories world-wide.
SaTScan was originally developed for geographical disease
Table 1. Priority pathogens previously described in hospital-
associated clusters.
Pathogen
Acinetobacter sp.
Alcaligenes sp.
Aspergillus sp.
Bacteroides sp.
Burkholderia sp.
Candida sp.
Chromobacterium sp.
Chryseobacterium sp.
Citrobacter sp..
Enterobacter sp.
Enterococcus sp.
Each species regardless of resistance profile
VRE
Escherichia sp.
Fusarium sp.
Group A Streptococcus
Haemophilus sp.
Klebsiella sp.
Legionella sp.
Malassezia sp..
Mycobacterium sp.
Oligella sp.
Pantoea sp.
Proteus sp.
Pseudomonas sp.
Rhizopus sp.
Salmonella sp.
Serratia sp.
S. aureus
All isolates regardless of resistance profile
MRSA
Stenotrophomonas sp.
Torulopsis sp.
All species individually assessed within genus.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000238.t001
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cancer clusters [8–10]. The software was subsequently enhanced
and applied to early detection of infectious disease outbreaks
[11,12]. We integrated the space-time permutation scan statistic in
SaTScan into the WHONET analysis module to create the
WHONET-SaTScan cluster detection tool, which is now freely
available as part of WHONET/BacLink as of June 2009 [7].
For hospital surveillance, ‘‘spatial’’ locations consisted of
individual wards and services (e.g., medicine, oncology). In
addition, we evaluated groups of wards or services sharing in
patient care (e.g., cardiology and cardiac surgery services),
regardless of physical proximity. Antimicrobial resistance profile
was also used as a spatial location to detect clusters of specific
pathogens that had identical patterns of nonsusceptibility to
routinely tested antibiotics. Using only case data, the space-time
permutation scan statistic looks for space-time interaction clusters,
adjusting for purely temporal and purely spatial variation [12].
The space-time cluster with the maximum likelihood is the cluster
least likely due to chance. For each pathogen in the Priority
Pathogen Nosocomial Dataset, a separate set of analyses were
done for wards, services, and antimicrobial resistance pattern. It is
important to note that this method will be subject to human-
influenced variation, such that if one ward expanded in volume
because of increasing bed size, then this increase may trigger a
cluster alert in the ward-based analysis.
Surveillance for hospital-wide clusters was performed by
replacing ‘‘space’’ in the space-time permutation scan statistic
with ‘‘pathogen.’’ This assessment was applied to the All Organism
Nosocomial Dataset, to detect clusters that were not explained by
a general simultaneous increase in all pathogens, as might occur
with new diagnostics that enhance overall pathogen detection by
culture systems or increased culturing because of changes in
physician practice. Similarly, the WHONET-SaTScan tool adjusts
for (i.e., would not detect) weekly or seasonal increases that
occurred simultaneously across all ‘‘spatial’’ locations, such as all
wards in the ward-based analyses, or all nosocomial pathogens in
the hospital-wide analyses. However, nosocomial increases in
specific wards would be detected in the ward-based analyses and
increases in specific pathogens would be detected in the hospital-
wide analyses.
Each pathogen-specific set of analyses was performed ‘‘daily’’
from 2002 to 2006, mimicking real-time prospective surveillance
among all patients admitted to BWH during this time period.
Within each set, the method adjusts for multiple testing inherent in
the many combinations of wards, services, pathogens, and
resistance patterns considered, and for the large number of days
evaluated.
Selecting WHONET-SaTScan Parameters
Datasets from 2001 were used to select software parameters.
The maximum number of days over which isolates could
contribute to the initial determination that a cluster had occurred
was set to 60 d. This parameter setting was based principally upon
biologic plausibility of ongoing transmission due to a common
source, as well as the practical ability to respond and intervene.
For example, if a cluster alert is signaled in December based upon
two cultures—one in the preceding January and one in
December—one might conclude that notification was unhelpful
since the prolonged time lapse since the January event makes it
unlikely that current investigation or intervention would be
meaningful. A maximum span of 60 d was chosen after the
2001 assessment of 30, 60, and 90 d revealed increased cluster
detection with 60 d, but minimal improvement with 90 d.
Because an ongoing cluster can span many months, we did not
restrict the time that a cluster could persist (continue to generate
alerts). If new cases continued to occur, they would generate alerts
as long as the statistical threshold was met. For presentation
purposes, alerts from the same cluster were combined into a
summary report that included the number of observed versus
expected cases across the duration of the cluster, the time from the
first culture of the cluster until the first alert, and the total duration
of the cluster. Thus, a cluster could be represented by a single alert
or a set of overlapping alerts that would signal a potential
outbreak. WHONET-SaTScan scanned for clusters on a daily
basis by comparing the number of cases in a specific time window
to the expected number based on the 365 d prior to the day of
analysis. We selected statistical thresholds for detecting clusters on
the basis of recurrence intervals [13]. The recurrence interval is
the expected frequency of falsely identifying a cluster by chance
alone. A recurrence interval of 100 d means that a cluster as
unusual as the identified cluster would occur by chance
approximately once every 100 d. We evaluated recurrence
intervals of 200, 365, and 1,000 d using the 2001 test dataset
and compared the results to 2001 clusters previously identified by
routine infection control surveillance and confirmed by genetic
typing of isolates. A recurrence interval threshold of $365 d was
selected, because recurrence intervals ,365 d were not associated
with known clusters and were of limited epidemiologic significance
based on available microbiology data and medical records.
WHONET-SaTScan Assessment Dataset
Through simulation, we mimicked daily prospective cluster
detection from 2002 to 2006 by adding each day’s experience and
repeating the analyses, as would occur in real time. Once an alert
was generated, alerts for the same cluster were generated on
subsequent days only if cases increased and the statistical threshold
was still met. Alert reports included the organism, alert type (e.g.,
ward, service, antibiotic profile, or hospital-wide), date of the first
alert for that cluster, date of the first specimen of that cluster,
observed and expected number of cases, and statistical significance
(i.e., the recurrence interval). Line-item culture results, including
date, location, and patient identifiers, were also generated for each
cluster alert.
Comparing WHONET-SaTScan to Routine Infection
Control Methods
Detailed infection control records from 2002 to 2006 were
reviewed for clusters on the basis of routine surveillance. We
compared WHONET-SaTScan results to two types of identified
clusters: (1) those with a known epidemiologic source and identical
strains by genetic typing, and (2) clusters of MRSA and VRE
defined by rule-based criteria involving $3 nosocomial cases in a
ward within 2 wk. These rule-based clusters triggered ward-wide
precautions involving alerts sent to nursing and physician
leadership, admission and weekly screening of all ward patients
(nares cultures for MRSA and rectal cultures for VRE), and use of
gloves for all patient contact until no new cases were identified for
a 4-wk period or until all cases were discharged from the ward. We
compared the ‘‘three in 2-wk’’ criteria for MRSA and VRE
clusters to statistically significant clusters identified by WHONET-
SaTScan.
Assessing Usefulness of Cluster Alerts
We assessed the usefulness and interpretability of the alert
notification system by creating daily alert reports using the 2002–
2006 dataset and providing these to two hospital epidemiologists
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indicated their level of concern and recommended actions on a
survey form. The survey asked whether the alert was considered
worth knowing about and which of four types of responses (ignore,
watch and wait, investigate with detailed chart review, and actively
intervene with ward-wide cluster precautions) was recommended.
Characteristics of clusters (size, type, recurrence interval) associ-
ated with active intervention were assessed using Fisher exact tests.
Surveys were completed with the knowledge of medical record
details (chronological ward and room assignments, service, culture
source, and antimicrobial susceptibility profile) that would have
been available in real time from cases. The concordance of survey
responses from the two hospital epidemiologists for initiating either
an investigation or active intervention was assessed by a kappa
statistic. Survey responses were also combined into a summary
description that used the more intensive response recommended
by either hospital epidemiologist.
Results
The All Organism Nosocomial Dataset from 2002 to 2006
included 298 organism codes and 32,482 isolates. The Priority
Pathogen Nosocomial Dataset included 41% of those isolates. All
but one cluster involved priority pathogens (Table 1).
Summary characteristics of WHONET-SaTScan clusters are
found in Table 2. A total of 59 clusters were identified in the 5-y
dataset, giving an average of 12 clusters per year. The mean and
median cluster sizes were 6 and 4, respectively. Detailed
descriptions of each cluster are found in Table 3. Two clusters
were identified by two different spatio-temporal analyses (e.g.,
ward-level and service-level).
Half of the detected clusters were gram-negative organisms not
routinely tracked by Infection Control. In addition, 71% of
clusters were identified by spatial characteristics other than
traditional ward-based location, including groups of wards and
services that shared patients and antimicrobial susceptibility
patterns. The most common alerts (41%) were triggered by
antibiotic resistance profiles. VRE clusters (n=4) comprised 57%
of enterococcal clusters and none were identified by ward-level
spatial analyses (all were geographically dispersed, but shared
antibiotic susceptibility profile). MRSA clusters comprised 58% of
S. aureus alerts, and only three of seven clusters were based upon
ward analyses (Table 3).
Comparison with Clusters Previously Detected by
Routine Infection Control Methods
Clusters identified using WHONET-SaTScan were compared
to clusters previously identified through routine infection control
surveillance. Other than pathogens identified by rule-based
criteria that were evaluated separately (see below), all clusters
previously identified and confirmed by the BWH Infection
Control Department were also identified by WHONET-SaTScan.
During the study period, the BWH Infection Control department
identified two major clusters involving multidrug-resistant Acineto-
bacter (2004) and Burkholderia cepacia (2005), both of which were
confirmed as clonal by pulse-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE). Both
clusters were identified by WHONET-SaTScan within 3 and 6 d,
respectively, of the initial isolate collection date.
The clonal cluster of multidrug-resistant Acinetobacter baumanii
involved patients in several intensive care units. WHONET-
SaTScan identified this cluster through hospital-wide clustering of
A. baumanii isolates (Figure 1A) as well as through clustering of a
specific antimicrobial susceptibility pattern (Figure 1B).
In contrast, the BWH Infection Control department only
identified three of the 59 clusters deemed to be statistically
significant events on the basis of WHONET-SaTScan (Table 3,
last column). Two coincided with the two clusters described above,
and one involved MRSA.
Comparison with Clusters Based on Numerical
Thresholds
We compared the results of the WHONET-SaTScan statistical
clusters to the rule-based criteria (i.e., $3 new nosocomial cases
on a single ward within 2 wk) that were used by the Infection
Control Department for MRSA and VRE during the study
period. Many more MRSA alerts were triggered by the rule-
based criteria (n=73) versus WHONET-SaTScan statistical
thresholds (n=7), and only one of them was in common. Of
interest, the one in common was a fairly large cluster of eight
nosocomial isolates in an intensive care unit. No isolates were sent
for genetic typing. Over half of the WHONET-SaTScan alerts
were triggered by spatial analyses other than a single ward. Four
alerts had a recurrence interval .1,000, and two reached the
highest possible recurrence interval allowed by our parameter
settings (10,000).
Similarly, many more VRE alerts were triggered by rule-based
criteria (n=87) versus WHONET-SaTScan statistical thresholds
(n=4). None of the alerts overlapped when methods were
compared. Details of MRSA and VRE clusters detected by both
methods are provided in Table 4. No additional overlap in MRSA
or VRE clusters was identified when the recurrence interval was
lowered to 200.
Table 2. Characteristics of detected clusters, 2002–2006.
Cluster Characteristics n (%)
Total clusters 59
Annual clusters: median (range) 12 (7–16)
Year
2002 14 (23.7)
2003 7 (11.9)
2004 10 (16.9)
2005 12 (20.3)
2006 16 (27.1)
Organisms
Gram positive 21 (35.6)
Gram negative 31 (52.5)
Fungi 7 (11.9)
Alert type
a
Hospital-wide 11 (18.0)
Ward(s) 16 (26.2)
Service(s) 8 (13.1)
Antibiotic profile 26 (42.6)
Size (n cases)
1–2 12 (20.3)
3–5 27 (45.8)
6–10 11 (18.6)
.10 9 (15.3)
aTwo clusters were identified by two different types of alerts.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000238.t002
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Organism Signal Type
Observed
Cases
Expected
Cases
Days to First
Signal
a
Span of
Signals
b
Cluster
Year
Recurrence
Interval
c
Previously
Identified by
Infection Control
Gram-positive bacteria
E. faecalis Antibiotic profile 4 0.6 18 25 2004 667 N
E. faecalis Service 4 0.6 10 17 2005 1,429 N
E. faecium Antibiotic profile 3 0.3 1 20 2006 1,429 N
E. faecium (VRE) Antibiotic profile 5 1.0 13 57 2002 625 N
E. faecium (VRE) Antibiotic profile 6 1.3 31 29 2002 769 N
E. faecium (VRE) Antibiotic profile 4 0.6 42 18 2003 1,429 N
E. faecium (VRE) Antibiotic profile 2 0.14 29 17 2004 500 N
Propionibacterium acnes Hospital-wide 10 2.7 11 7 2006 1,429 N
S. aureus Antibiotic profile 2 0.0 0 5 2002 2,000 N
S. aureus Ward 3 0.1 0 2 2003 833 N
S. aureus Ward 3 0.1 1 1 2003 833 N
S. aureus Ward 7 1.1 6 16 2004 667 N
S. aureus Antibiotic profile 4 0.3 2 4 2006 385 N
S. aureus (MRSA) Antibiotic profile 14 2.8 1 67 2002 10,000 N
S. aureus (MRSA) Ward 3 0.1 0 6 2005 5,000 N
S. aureus (MRSA) Ward 8 1.4 6 54 2004 10,000 Y
S. aureus (MRSA)
d Ward 6 0.91 33 15 2005 833 N
S. aureus (MRSA)
d Service 4 0.44 8 5 2005 625 N
S. aureus (MRSA) Antibiotic profile 2 0.04 6 4 2005 667 N
S. aureus (MRSA) Service 6 1.05 8 9 2006 2,500 N
S. aureus (MRSA) Antibiotic profile 2 0.09 4 3 2006 435 N
Streptococcus, Group A Hospital-wide 3 0.2 0 15 2005 3,333 N
Gram-negative bacteria
A. baumannii Multi Service 4 0.8 2 24 2002 5,000 N
A. baumannii Hospital-wide 5 0.5 1 6 2002 588 N
A. baumannii
e Antibiotic profile 15 7.5 18 52 2004 10,000 Y
A. baumannii
e Hospital-wide 20 8.3 3 57 2004 625 Y
A. baumannii Ward 4 0.6 3 9 2006 2,000 N
Bacteroides fragilis Service 2 0.2 4 1 2006 500 N
B. cepacia Hospital-wide 15 3.8 6 60 2005 10,000 Y
C. freundii Antibiotic profile 2 0.1 4 27 2006 10,000 N
E. aerogenes Antibiotic profile 3 1.8 2 26 2006 909 N
E. cloacae Antibiotic profile 3 0.0 1 28 2002 10,000 N
E. cloacae Hospital-wide 11 2.7 2 6 2002 1,250 N
E. cloacae Antibiotic profile 4 0.5 4 2 2005 476 N
E. cloacae Service 11 3.6 14 46 2005 370 N
E. cloacae Antibiotic profile 4 0.3 6 33 2006 769 N
E. cloacae Multiward 5 0.8 20 36 2006 2500 N
E. cloacae Antibiotic profile 27 4.3 42 163 2006 10,000 N
E. coli Antibiotic profile 4 0.5 3 34 2002 476 N
E. coli Antibiotic profile 6 1.1 6 9 2005 2,500 N
H. influenzae Hospital-wide 13 4.2 18 14 2004 455 N
H. influenzae Antibiotic profile 6 1.0 8 52 2006 5,000 N
K. oxytoca Antibiotic profile 2 0.2 24 12 2004 1111 N
K. oxytoca Antibiotic profile 2 0.2 0 30 2006 10,000 N
K. pneumoniae Ward 3 0.2 3 16 2003 909 N
P. (Entero.) agglomerans Hospital-wide 4 0.2 4 2 2002 400 N
Automated Hospital Outbreak Detection
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persistent by the BWH Infection Control Department to warrant
sending isolates for typing. Both involved MRSA. One occurred
in the 2001 dataset that was used for parameterization (thus, not
provided in Table 5). This cluster was rapidly detected by
WHONET-SaTScan. The other cluster was an intensive care
unit cluster in 2004 that was not detected by WHONET-
SaTScan. This cluster involved nine nosocomial cases, but
genetic typing revealed six different strain types, and the Infection
Control Department ultimately ruled that this was not an
outbreak.
Assessing Utility and Response to Daily Alerts
Thehospitalepidemiologistsclassified95%ofthe 59clusteralerts
as useful information. Sixteen (27%) of the clusters were classified as
warranting either investigation or active intervention by at least one
epidemiologist and 11(19%) by both (kappa=0.76, confidence
interval 0.5–0.8). The remaining 43 (73%) clusters were classified as
Figure 1. Display of monthly nosocomial A. baumanii isolates. (A) Hospital-wide. (B) Restricted to isolates with an identical antibiotic
susceptibility profile. Shaded area in gray indicates time period of cluster detection by WHONET-SaTScan.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000238.g001
Organism Signal Type
Observed
Cases
Expected
Cases
Days to First
Signal
a
Span of
Signals
b
Cluster
Year
Recurrence
Interval
c
Previously
Identified by
Infection Control
P. aeruginosa Multi Service 5 0.6 4 7 2002 833 N
P. aeruginosa Antibiotic profile 3 0.2 2 7 2004 476 N
P. aeruginosa Ward 2 0.0 1 3 2005 476 N
S. marcescens Antibiotic profile 3 0.4 34 10 2002 435 N
S. marcescens Multi Service 4 0.5 12 4 2003 556 N
S. marcescens Hospital-wide 10 2.8 10 3 2004 2,500 N
S. marcescens Antibiotic profile 11 1.4 21 118 2006 10,000 N
S. maltophilia Ward 3 0.3 6 9 2006 2,000 N
Fungi
A. fumigatus Hospital-wide 7 1.4 20 57 2004 417 N
C. albicans Ward 7 1.1 12 9 2003 667 N
C. albicans Ward 2 0.0 0 2 2005 588 N
C. albicans Multiward 14 2.6 51 36 2005 10,000 N
C. krusei Ward 2 0.3 7 11 2002 10,000 N
C. lusitaniae Hospital-wide 2 0.0 0 1 2002 370 N
T. (Candida) glabrata Ward 4 0.4 24 1 2003 1,250 N
aNumber of days from the first culture associated with the cluster and the date of the first alert.
bNumber of days between the first and the last alert for a cluster.
cReflects the frequency (d) in which such as cluster is expected to occur by chance alone. Only clusters meeting a threshold recurrence interval of $365 d are provided.
d–eIndicates same cluster identified by more than one signal type.
N, no; Y, yes.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000238.t003
Table 3. Cont.
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epidemiologists (Table 5). There were four clusters where the two
epidemiologists disagreed about initiating active intervention. The
reason for the discrepancies were due to a low number of events
leadingone epidemiologist to await further cases beforeacting while
the other initiated intervention because of the significance of the
pathogens (aspergillus, pseudomonas) or the source of the isolates
(bacteremias). Certain cluster characteristics were associated with
the likelihood of initiating active intervention (Figure 2).
Discussion
The automated WHONET-SaTScan cluster detection tool
rapidly detected epidemiologically confirmed hospital outbreaks in
a large academic medical center and demonstrated that the
common use of rule-based criteria (i.e., $3 new nosocomial cases
on a single ward within 2 wk) for identifying clusters of MDROs
often led to the identification of events likely to occur because of
normal random fluctuations. Using a statistical method for cluster
detection can focus hospital epidemiology efforts and conserve
resources for events likely to represent actual outbreaks.
Current methods for cluster detection in hospitals are labor-
intensive, narrow in focus, and subject to both over- and under-
ascertainment of clusters. We linked two publicly available
software systems to screen microbiology data for statistically
significant clusters among all pathogens, across all wards and
services.
In a single center study, we introduced the WHONET-
SaTScan cluster detection tool and showed that it outperforms
current infection control surveillance systems in several ways. First,
it is more comprehensive. It is able to evaluate all pathogens with
the potential to produce hospital-associated clusters. Current
infection control surveillance is heavily focused on a small number
of highly antibiotic-resistant bacteria, most of which are gram-
positive pathogens. We found that two-thirds of identified clusters
were due to gram-negative or fungal pathogens not under routine
surveillance.
Second, the automated nature of WHONET-SaTScan makes it
labor-sparing compared to usual surveillance, which identifies
clusters from daily microbiologic feeds using the trained human
eye. This software can be run daily within seconds and can provide
a prospective tool for real-time cluster detection. Furthermore, the
use of routinely available microbiologic data makes it adaptable by
all hospitals using conventional microbiologic data systems. More
Table 5. Correlation of two hospital epidemiologists
independently assessing WHONET-SaTScan clusters.
Ignore Watch Investigate
Actively
Intervene Total
Ignore 25 11 1 0 37 (63%)
Watch 2 5 1 2 10 (17%)
Investigate 0 0 0 0 0 (0%)
Actively
Intervene
1 0 1 10 12 (20%)
Total 28 (47%) 16 (27%) 3 (5%) 12 (20%) 59 (100%)
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000238.t005
Table 4. Characteristics of MRSA and VRE clusters detected by routine infection control surveillance compared to WHONET-
SaTScan.
Cluster Time Period Infection Control Detection WHONET-SaTScan Detection
Dual
Detection
n Clusters
Cases
(Mean)
Duration
(Mean Days)
Cluster
Type
a n Clusters
Cases
(Mean)
Duration
(Mean Days) Cluster Type n Clusters
MRSA
2002 14 10.8 96.5 Ward 1 14 67.0 Antibiotic profile 0
2003 11 11.1 100.3 Ward 0 — — — 0
2004 18 6.9 65.3 Ward 1 8 54.0 Ward 1
2005 18 5.9 52.4 Ward 3 3.7 8.3 Ward, ward/service,
antibiotic profile
0
2006 12 4.9 48.0 Ward 2 4 6.0 Service, antibiotic profile 0
5-y total 73 — — — 7 — — — 1
Annual mean 14.6 7.9 72.5 — 1.4 5.9 27.1 — 0.2
Annual median 14 6.9 65.3 — 1.0 4.0 8.3 — 0
VRE
2002 15 7.6 71.2 Ward 2 5.5 43.0 Antibiotic profile 0
2003 12 6.4 62.8 Ward 1 4.0 18.0 Antibiotic profile 0
2004 20 8.2 74.1 Ward 1 2.0 17.0 Antibiotic profile 0
2005 18 7.2 69.1 Ward 0 — — — 0
2006 22 6.0 58.3 Ward 0 — — — 0
5-y total 87 — — — 4 — — — 0
Annual mean 17.4 7.1 67.1 — 0.8 2.3 15.6 — 0
Annual median 18 7.2 69.1 — 1 2 17 — 0
aInfection Control identification of clusters was limited to wards only.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000238.t004
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investigation of perceived clusters that are merely chance
aggregations. These perceived clusters often result in substantial
intervention costs and efforts on behalf of infection control and
involved hospital wards.
Third, WHONET-SaTScan provides a statistical basis for
cluster identification, thus improving the likelihood that the
clusters represent health care–associated transmission events.
When compared to conventional surveillance that uses numerical
thresholds (rule-based criteria such as three cases in 2 wk in a
single ward), we found that there was no significant statistical basis
for nearly all of the clusters identified by routine infection control
surveillance. This finding is not surprising given the rise in
prevalence of MRSA and VRE—pathogens to which these rules
are applied. In the example of MRSA, not only did rule-based
criteria identify a large number of clusters (,14/y) that may not
have been real, but it failed to identify the once-a-year occurrence
of a highly statistically significant cluster. Findings were even more
striking for VRE. Although we recognize that statistical signifi-
cance should not be the sole driver of cluster detection and
response, the large discrepancy between statistically identified
clusters and those found by infection control rule-based criteria
suggests that statistical alerts (and lack of alerts) may provide a
critical piece of information to guide action.
These results suggest that much of current infection control
surveillance for nosocomial clusters may be ineffective, failing to
find true clusters that may indicate unusual nosocomial transmis-
sion and identifying numerous events that likely represent random
variation from a baseline rate as clusters that warrant resource-
intensive investigation and response. The reduction in the number
of MRSA and VRE clusters more than offset the increased
number of clusters that resulted from identifying clusters caused by
all pathogens. If this is a typical result, then statistically based
surveillance could provide a major redirection of scarce infection
control efforts. Notably, WHONET-SaTScan was able to identify
the major pathogen clusters known to infection control that had
clear epidemiologic links and evidence of genetic clonality.
Finally, the predictive value of alerts based on this scanning
technique was acceptably high. Nearly all reported clusters were
deemed of interest by the two hospital epidemiologists, and .25%
generated sufficient concern to initiate an active investigation or
full-scale intervention.
There are several limitations to this evaluation. First, it is a
single center study providing subjective evaluation by two hospital
epidemiologists, both of whom have been affected by prior
experience at that hospital. Additional assessment in other centers
is needed for validation.
Specifically, prospective validation is needed to evaluate
whether statistical clusters are sufficiently important to warrant
action, and whether ignoring rule-based clusters leads to no harm.
In this study, we placed a subjective value on the WHONET-
SaTScan clusters and assumed that all infection control clusters
were deemed of high value. It was not possible to similarly assess
the infection control clusters since action was taken once rule-
based criteria were met. In addition, the recurrence interval was
part of the assessment of WHONET-SaTScan clusters and this
was not available for infection control clusters. The discrepancy
between the WHONET-SaTScan results and the rule-based
clusters can only be known in a prospective fashion when
knowledge of statistical alerts can be integrated with clinical
judgment to determine if action will be taken, and if a large cluster
ensues because of inaction. If the value of statistical alerts
Figure 2. Graph showing survey-based Infection Control response by type of WHONET-SaTScan cluster. Significant differences among
organism type and cluster size were noted when assessing the likelihood of triggering an intervention (Fisher exact tests). A trend toward a
significant difference was found among cluster types. Among organism type, the likelihood of a cluster triggering an intervention was: gram-positive
(43%), gram-negative (13%), fungal (14%). Among cluster size, the likelihood of a cluster triggering an intervention was: 2–5 (13%), 6–10 (45%), 10+
(44%). Among recurrence interval, the likelihood of a cluster triggering an intervention was: 365–999 (20%), 1,000–5,000 (20%), .5,000 (36%). Among
cluster type, the likelihood of a cluster was: hospital (27%), antibiotic profile (12%), ward (38%), and service (50%).
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000238.g002
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provide a valuable tool for standardizing outbreak detection and
evaluating the impact of various interventions to reduce
nosocomial transmission.
Beyond further validation, this work requires replication and
assessment of generalizability in other hospitals. Nevertheless,
because it bases cluster determination on expected numbers of
cases from recent history, it is adaptable to the varying conditions
across institutions and the changing rates of pathogen colonization
and infection. In this analysis, we identified clusters by comparing
cluster case counts to the ‘‘spatial’’ and temporal locations of all
other cases occurring during a 365-d period. Although this
identification allows the analyses to be robust to secular trends in
the prevalence of pathogens arising from different wards and
services, other baseline periods could have been selected.
Secondly, clustering does not prove that there is an important
biologic connection between cases. No matter what recurrence
interval is selected, some clusters with a lower recurrence interval
will reflect hospital transmission and some that exceed the value
will be chance events. We do not have a precise estimate of this
frequency because we performed a large number of scans across all
pathogens and spatial dimensions. Further evaluation is needed to
ensure that the threshold does not yield an unacceptable number
of signals that are deemed of no interest. In this instance, the
average of 12 alerts per year was far fewer than the number of
clusters currently being identified by the Infection Control
department. Notably, in this study, lowering the statistical
threshold did not increase the overlap between WHONET-
SaTScan clusters and those found by infection control.
In conclusion, we demonstrate the usefulness of automated
cluster detection that uses readily available microbiology data to
identify clusters of clinically relevant nosocomial pathogens. This
approach to cluster detection has the potential to be more
comprehensive than current surveillance systems and save
substantial amounts of infection control resources [14]. Most
importantly and provocatively, these findings suggest that many of
the events that trigger outbreak control protocols probably
represent random variation rather than true outbreaks. Addition-
ally, current infection control methods fail to identify a majority of
events that are statistically unusual and may represent opportu-
nities for intervention. This statistically based cluster detection tool
could be readily implemented to improve and streamline the daily
practice of infection control professionals.
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Background. Admission to a hospital is often a life-saving
necessity—individuals injured in a road accident, for
example, may need immediate medical and surgical
attention if they are to survive. Unfortunately, many
patients acquire infections, some of which are life-
threatening, during their stay in a hospital. The World
Health Organization has estimated that, globally, 8.7% of
hospital patients develop hospital-acquired infections
(infections that are identified more than two days after
admission to hospital). In the US alone, 2 million people
develop a hospital-acquired infection every year, often an
infection of a surgical wound, or a urinary tract or lung
infection. Infections are common among hospital patients
because increasing age or underlying illnesses can reduce
immunity to infection and because many medical and
surgical procedures bypass the body’s natural protective
barriers. In addition, poor infection control practices can
facilitate the transmission of bacteria—including meticillin-
resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) and vancomycin-
resistant enterococci (VRE)—and other infectious agents
(pathogens) between patients.
Why Was This Study Done? Sometimes, the number of
cases of hospital-acquired infections increases unexpectedly
or a new infection emerges. Such clusters account for
relatively few health care–associated infections, but, because
they may arise from the transmission of a pathogen within a
hospital, they need to be rapidly identified and measures
implemented (for example, isolation of affected patients) to
stop transmission if an outbreak is confirmed. Currently, the
detection of clusters of hospital-acquired infections is based
on simple rules, such as the occurrence of three new cases of
a single pathogen in two weeks on the same ward. This rule-
based approach relies on the human eye to detect infection
clusters within microbiology data (information collected on
the pathogens isolated from patients), it focuses on a few
pathogens, and it does not consider the random variation in
infection rates or the possibility that clusters might be
associated with shared facilities rather than with individual
wards. In this study, the researchers test whether an
automated statistical system can detect outbreaks of
hospital-acquired infections quickly and accurately.
What Did the Researchers Do and Find? The researchers
combined two software packages used to track diseases in
populations to create the WHONET-SaTScan cluster
detection tool. They then compared the clusters of
hospital-acquired infection identified by the new tool in
microbiology data from a 750-bed US academic medical
center with those generated by the hospital’s infection
control program, which was largely based on the simple rule
described above. WHONET-SaTScan found 59 clusters of
infection that occurred between 2002 and 2006, about three-
quarters of which were identified by characteristics other
than a ward-based location. Nearly half the cluster alerts
were generated on the basis of shared antibiotic
susceptibility patterns. Although WHONET-SaTScan
identified all the clusters previously identified by the
hospital’s infection control program, it classified most of
these clusters as likely to be the result of normal random
variations in infection rates rather than the result of ‘‘true’’
outbreaks. By contrast, the hospital’s infection control
department only identified three of the 59 statistically
significant clusters identified by WHONET-SaTScan.
Furthermore, the new tool identified six previously
unknown MRSA outbreaks and four previously unknown
VRE outbreaks. Finally, two hospital epidemiologists
(scientists who study diseases in populations) classified
95% of the clusters detected by WHONET-SaTScan as
worthy of consideration by the hospital infection control
team and a quarter of the clusters as warranting active
investigation or intervention.
What Do These Findings Mean? These findings suggest
that automated statistical software should be able to detect
clusters of hospital-acquired infections that would escape
detection using routine rule-based systems. Importantly,
they also suggest that an automated system would be able
to discount a large number of supposed outbreaks identified
by rule-based systems. These findings need to be confirmed
in other settings and in prospective studies in which the
outcomes of clusters detected with WHONET-SaTScan are
carefully analyzed. For now, however, these findings suggest
that automated statistical tools could provide hospital
infection control experts with valuable real-time guidance
by identifying outbreaks that would be missed by routine
detection methods and by preventing the implementation
of intensive and costly infection control measures in
situations where they are unnecessary.
Additional Information. Please access these Web sites via
the online version of this summary at http://dx.doi.org/10.
1371/journal.pmed.1000238.
N The World Health Organization’s Prevention of Hospital-
Acquired Infections, A Practical Guide contains detailed
information on all aspects of hospital-acquired infections
N MedlinePlus provides links to information on infection
control in hospitals (in English and Spanish)
N The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention also
provides information on infectious diseases in health care
settings (in English and Spanish)
N The WHONET/Baclink software and the SatScan software,
the two components of WHONET-SaTScan are both avail-
able on the internet (the WHONET-SaTScan cluster
detection tool is freely available as part of the version of
WHONET/BacLink released June 2009)
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